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TORTS
I. PRODUCTS LLImrrY
A. State of the Art Evidence Admissible in Design Defect
Cases
In Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc.,1 the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals. held that, if presented with the issue, the
South Carolina Supreme Court would permit the introduction of
state of the art evidence to determine the existence of a design
defect in a strict products liability suit.2 Although the appeals
court failed to define the term "state of the art," it held that
evidence of this type would be relevant, although not conclusive,
to a finding of strict liability.
4
The plaintiffs in Reed were returning to their home in Flor-
1. 697 F.2d 1192 (4th Cir. 1982).
2. Id. at 1196. As distinguished from negligence actions, strict liability suits do not
require an inquiry into the defendant's due care. The theory of strict liability is outlined
in the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) and accompanying comments.
South Carolina legislatively adopted § 402A in S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (1976), which
provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer, or to his property, is subject to liability for physical
harm caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) shall apply although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
Section 15-73-30 (1976) incorporates by reference the comments to § 402A.
3. The phrase "state of the art" has varied meanings. Courts may define the phrase
as the latest technology, the most advanced technology available on the market, the most
advanced technology available that is also economically feasible, or, technology that is
customarily used by the industry. For discussions explaining the various meanings given
the phrase "state of the art," see Robb, A Practical Approach to Use of State of the Art
Evidence in Strict Products Liability Cases, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1982), and Spradley,
Defensive Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Products Liability, 67 MINN. L.
REV. 343 (1982).
4. 697 F.2d at 1197-98.
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ida when the motor home in which they were traveling was
struck by an automobile in South Carolina.5 Upon impact, the
motor home burst into flames. Plaintiffs filed suit in federal dis-
trict court in South Carolina, seeking actual and punitive6 dam-
ages from the vehicle manufacturer. The case was tried on a the-
ory of strict liability.
7
During trial, the defendant offered evidence of state of the
art and the custom of trade to demonstrate that the design of
the motor home's fuel system was not defective.8 The plaintiffs
objected, claiming that the proffered evidence was irrelevant in a
strict liability case.' The trial judge overruled the objection, and
5. Id. at 1195.
6. The South Carolina Supreme Court has not had occasion to decide whether puni-
tive damages may be recovered in strict liability suits. 697 F.2d at 1195 n.1. Although the
court in Reed maintained that it was not deciding the issue of whether punitive damages
may be recovered in suits filed under a theory of liability without fault, id., the court
mentioned the possibility of punitive damages as another reason to admit state of the art
evidence in design defect, strict liability cases. Id. at 1198. The court reasoned that the
defendant's compliance with industry standards and state of the art in designing the
motor home would be probative on the issue of the wantonness, willfulness, and mali-
ciousness of the placement of the vehicle's fuel tank in the instant case. Id. For a discus-
sion of the treatment of punitive damages in strict liability cases, see J. BEASLEY, Prod-
ucts Liability and the Unreasonably Dangerous Requirement, 651-70 (1981). Also, see
generally Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of
Defective Products, 49 U. CH. L. REV. 1 (1982); Note, Punitive Damages in Strict Prod-
ucts Liability Litigation, 23 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 333 (1981); Note, Punitive Damage
Awards in Strict Products Liability Litigation: The Doctrine, the Debate, the Defenses,
42 OHIo ST. L.J. 771 (1981).
7. 697 F.2d at 1195. The federal court was required to apply South Carolina law to
settle the issue because jurisdiction was based on the diversity of the parties. Id.
8. Id. The defendant used the testimony of the defendant's president and the intro-
duction of a number of motor home brochures to show that a large number of motor
home manufacturers used a similar fuel system design. Brief of Appellee at 4.
9. The plaintiffs had also introduced evidence of industry standards and state of the
art concerning fuel systems and the placement of fuel tanks in motor homes. The Reeds
presented expert testimony comparing different designs and assessing the fire hazards
associated with fuel tank placement. 697 F.2d at 1195 n.2. On appeal, the defendant
maintained that the plaintiffs could not challenge their defensive use of state of the art
evidence when the plaintiffs had placed the matter in issue. See Brief of Appellee at 10-
16. The plaintiffs contended that they offered the evidence for the limited purposes of
qualifying an expert witness, showing the feasibility of other fuel system designs, dis-
crediting one of the defendant's expert witnesses, and establishing grounds for punitive
damages. 697 F.2d at 1195. The appeals court concluded that, based on the plaintiffs'
expert testimony showing knowledge of safety features within the industry, the juiy
could infer that Tiffin had designed a defective and unreasonably dangerous product not
meeting industry standards and state of the art, id. at 1195 n.2. However, the court re-
fused to hold that the plaintiffs' use of such evidence barred their claim. Id. at 1195.
2
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the jury returned a verdict for the defendant from which the
plaintiffs appealed. 10
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court decision." Although the South Carolina Supreme Court
had not ruled on the admissibility of state of the art evidence in
design defect products liability cases,'2 the appeals court pre-
dicted that the supreme court, following the majority of jurisdic-
tions that have considered the matter, would allow the evi-
dence.1- In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on two
recent South Carolina cases, Claytor v. General Motors Corp.'
4
and Young v. Tide Craft, Inc.1
5
Reed focused on the cost-benefit analysis adopted by the su-
preme court in Claytor.s The court in Claytor stated that fac-
tors such as the product's usefulness and desirability, the cost of
added safety, the likelihood and potential seriousness of injury,
and the obviousness of potential damages must be balanced to
determine whether a product's design is defective.'7 The appeals
court cited Young for a design defect test based on consumer
expectation.' 8 Young relied on comments to the Restatement
(Second) of Torts that support finding a product defective only
if it was "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it with
the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
10. 697 F.2d at 1194.
11. Id. at 1194, 1200.
12. Id. at 1195.
13. Id. at 1196. The court in Reed cited Singleton v. International Harvester Co.,
685 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1981); Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir.
1976); Raney v. Honeywell, Inc., 540 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1976); Hoppe v. Midwest Con-
veyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1973); Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252
(5th Cir. 1973), and J. BFAsLEY, supra note 6, at S93-410, in support of the admissibility
of the evidence. The court in Reed rejected cases cited by the plaintiffs which banned
the use of state of the art evidence, including Holloway v. J.B. Systems, Ltd., 609 F.2d
1069 (3d Cir. 1979); and Walker v. Trico Mfg. Co., 487 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1973). The
court distinguished these cases on the ground that Pennsylvania and Illinois had
adopted strict liability statutes which differed substantially from S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-
73-10 (1976). 697 F.2d at 1197. For an extensive listing of cases on the use of state of the
art evidence in design defect cases see Robb, supra note 3, at 11.
14. 277 S.C. 259, 286 S.E.2d 129 (1982). For a analysis of Claytor, see Torts, Annual
Survey of S.C. Law, 35 S.C.L. REv. 184 (1983).
15. 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978).
16. 697 F.2d at 1196-97.
17. 277 S.C. at 265, 286 S.E.2d at 132.
18. 697 F.2d at 1197.
TORTS1985]
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characteristics."19 The court in Reed, reasoning that the Claytor
cost-benefit test was "necessarily" relevant to the Young deter-
mination of consumer expectations,20 concluded that state of the
art evidence aided the jury in determining whether a product
was unreasonably dangerous beyond the expectations of the or-
dinary consumer.2' The court stated that it was compelled to up-
hold the lower court. The appeals court, however, maintained
that while state of the art evidence is "necessary and proba-
tive, '22 it is not conclusive as to the issue of liability.
23
The court's determination that state of the art evidence is
helpful in gauging consumer expectations may be questioned.
Neither the court in Reed,24 nor the South Carolina Supreme
Court 25 has explained the meaning of the term "state of the art."
If state of the art is defined as industry custom or standards, the
evidence would be probative of consumer expectations. However,
state of the art may also describe the most technologically ad-
vanced product developments,26 which may be unavailable in the
marketplace and, therefore, would not be within the knowledge
of the ordinary consumer. A further criticism is that state of the
art evidence deflects the focus of inquiry from the defendant's
product to the conduct of other manufacturers in designing sim-
ilar goods. This shift appears to violate the mandate of South
19. 270 S.C. at 471, 242 S.E.2d at 680 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TonS §
402A comment i (1965)).
20. 697 F.2d at 1197.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1197-98.
24. It is apparent, however, that the court means something more than industry
custom alone. The court held that, "[S]tate of the art and trade customs are relevant in
helping the jury make a determination of whether the product is unreasonably dangerous
when used in a manner expected by the ordinary consumer in the community." 697 F.2d
at 1197 (emphasis added).
25. Because there have been few decisions by the court in the area of products lia-
bility since the legislature adopted strict liability in tort in 1976, the South Carolina
Supreme Court has not had occasion to explain what is meant by the term "state of the
art." Major products liability decisions such as Young, Claytor, and the recent case of
Schall v. Sturm, Ruger Co., 278 S.C. 646, 300 S.E.2d 735 (1983), provide no guidance
concerning the court's interpretation of the term.
26. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
27. A widely quoted opinion espousing this view is Bailey v. Boatland of Houston,
Inc., 585 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App. 1979), rev'd, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980). The Texas
Court of Civil Appeals held that the use of state of the art evidence of boat-stopping
safety switches would emasculate the doctrine of strict products liability and lead to a
266 [Vol. 36
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Carolina legislation allowing the defendant to be held strictly li-
able even when all possible care has been exercised in the prepa-
ration and sale of the product. 8 Such comparisons of conduct
arguably return the court to a negligence analysis.
In Schall v. Sturm, Ruger Co.,29 a case decided after Reed,
the South Carolina Supreme Court made clear that negligence
and strict liability theories are not to be blended in South Caro-
lina. The court in Schall stated that an "entirely new species of
action came into being" in South Carolina when the legislature
adopted strict liability in tort.30 The supreme court interpreted
the legislation as a rejection of "hybrid" versions of strict liabil-
ity statutes that combine elements of warranty or negligence
with strict liability.3 1 Insofar as Reed injects elements of negli-
gence analysis into a strict liability suit, it may, in light of
Schall, have been wrongly decided.
Despite its analytical problems, Reed can be supported. If
state of the art is defined as industry custom or standards, the
evidence may aid the trier of fact in determining consumer ex-
pectations.32 A jury may also find that an ability to apply empir-
ical evidence, such as conduct, makes the test easier to under-
stand. Certainly, a clearly defined and comprehensible test of
liability will assist manufacturers and sellers in predicting the
costs of foreseeable injuries associated with new products. The
ability to predict these costs would permit the seller to alter the
product's design or to obtain adequate insurance before market-
ing the product.
Even if state of the art is defined as the most advanced
technology in existence, this evidence may be helpful in deciding
whether to hold the defendant strictly liable. The trier of fact
may decide that the imposition of strict liability is unreasonable
if the feature which would have made the product's design safer
return to a negligence analysis. Id. at 809. The Texas Supreme Court disagreed with the
appeals court's analysis and ruled that state of the art evidence was properly admitted
during the trial. 609 S.W.2d at 745.
28. See supra note 2.
29. 278 S.C. 646, 300 S.E.2d 735 (1983).
30. Id. at 648, 300 S.E.2d at 736.
31. Id. at 649, 300 S.E.2d at 736.
32. For a discussion of the considerations affecting what test of liability to apply, see
generally Hubbard, Efficiency, Expectation, and Justice: A Jurisprudential Analysis of
the Concept of Unreasonably Dangerous Product Defect, 28 S.C.L. REv. 587 (1977).
19851
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was not in existence when the product was sold.3 One commen-
tator suggests that courts that refuse to allow evidence of the
existing state of technical knowledge improperly extend the doc-
trine of strict liability to one of absolute liability.3
Reed is persuasive but not controlling authority for the
South Carolina Supreme Court. Defendants may argue the Reed
approach to the admissibility of evidence should be adopted be-
cause state of the art evidence would facilitate the determina-
tion of whether a product's design is unreasonably dangerous.
Plaintiffs may be expected to urge that the supreme court reject
the Fourth Circuit analysis as contrary to legislative intent and
to policy arguments contained in the recent supreme court deci-
sion of Schall v. Sturm, Ruger Co.
Mary Donne Peters
B. Inapplicability of Strict Liability Statute to Products
Entering Market Before Statute's Enactment
Sellers who placed defective products into the stream of
commerce before July 9, 1974, will not face suit under South
Carolina's strict products liability laws. The South Carolina Su-
preme Court held that no cause of action in strict liability exists
if the product entered the market prior to the enactment of
South Carolina's strict liability statute,35 even if that product
causes injury after the statute's effective date.38 The supreme
court is among the first of the state courts to address the retro-
activity of a strict liability statute.
In Schall v. Sturm, Ruger Co., 37 the plaintiff was injured in
1980 when he dropped a loaded revolver that was manufactured
and sold in 1972.38 The plaintiff filed suit against the gun manu-
33. But see Spradley, supra note 3, at 422-23. Spradley suggests that when the de-
fendant in a design defect strict liability case is a manufacturer, the commercial unavail-
ability of a safety device at the time his product was manufactured should not necessa-
rily result in a finding of no liability. He suggests that such a rule might encourage
manufacturers as a group to make a bare bones product and thus delay the development
of safety features. Id.
34. See Robb, supra note 3, at 16.
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (1976)(text set out supra note 2).
36. 278 S.C. 646, 300 S.E.2d 735 (1983).
37. Id.
38. See Brief of Plaintiff at 2. The gun was purchased by the plaintiff in 1979. Id.
[Vol. 36
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facturer in federal court under South Carolina's strict products
liability statute.3 9 The federal district court certified to the state
supreme court the question of whether a cause of action exists
under section 15-73-10 of the South Carolina Code when the
product that produced the injury after the effective date of the
statute was sold before the law was enacted. 0 The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court answered the question in the negative.4'
The supreme court explained its refusal to find a cause of
action by defining strict liability. The court stated that "an en-
tirely new species of action" was created by the General Assem-
bly when it adopted strict liability in tort.42 The legislature's de-
cision to codify the Restatement (Second) of Torts' version of
strict liability43 was interpreted as a rejection of hybrid statutory
forms that combine elements of warranty or negligence.44
The state's strict liability statute does not address when a
cause of action arises. The court determined that an analysis of
the concept of liability without fault likewise failed to yield a
time when liability may be said to exist.4 6 The court noted that
the operative events for a determination of liability are the date
of sale, under warranty law, and the date of injury, under the
law of negligence.47 The court maintained, however, that any
search for an operative event under strict liability would distort
its unique nature.48 Key to the court's refusal to isolate a single
point in the sequence of events composing a strict liability cause
39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (1976).
40. See S.C. Sup. CT. R. 46(1), which provides in pertinent part-
The Supreme Court in its discretion may answer questions of law certified to it
by any federal court of the United States or the highest appellate court or an
intermediate appellate court of any other state, when requested by the certify-
ing court if there are involved in any proceeding before that court questions of
law of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the
certifying court as to which it appears to the certifying court there is not con-
trolling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court.
S.C. Sup. CT. R. 46(1).
41. 278 S.C. at 648, 300 S.E.2d at 735.
42. Id., 300 S.E.2d at 736.
43. R STATEmw_ (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). For a discussion of strict liabil-
ity in tort, see W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971) §§ 75-81.
44. 278 S.C. at 649, 300 S.E.2d at 736.
45. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (1976)(text set out supra note 2).
46. 278 S.C. at 649, 300 S.E.2d at 736.
47. Id.
48. Id.
1985]
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of action is the court's finding that, "Strict liability would best
be analogized to a legal status: inchoate at the moment when the
product leaves the seller's hands in a defective condition that is
unreasonably dangerous; ripe for determination at the instant of
injury; and fixed by action and final judgment.
'4 9
The court turned to policy considerations in resolving the
timing question. In the absence of specific statutory provisions,
or clear legislative intent to the contrary, the court stated it
would follow the "well settled rule" in South Carolina that a
statute may not be applied retroactively.50 The court concluded
that a cause of action based on strict liability does not exist in
South Carolina if the injury-producing product entered the
stream of commerce before July 9, 1974, the effective date of
section 15-73-10.51
When the supreme court decided Schall, three other state
supreme courts had addressed the question of whether plaintiffs
should be permitted to file suit under strict liability statutes
when a defective product sold before the law's passage produced
a post-enactment injury. 2 The supreme courts of Arkansas
53
49. Id.
50. Id. at 650, 300 S.E.2d at 737. For cases cited by Schall that hold statutes may
not be retroactively applied absent specific provision or clear legislative intent to the
contrary, see Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co. of New York v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 278 S.C.
332, 295 S.E.2d 783 (1982); Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. South Carolina Second Injury
Fund, 277 S.C. 604, 291 S.E.2d 667 (1982); Boyd v. Boyd, 277 S.C. 416, 289 S.E.2d 153
(1982); Hercules, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 274 S.C. 137, 262 S.E.2d 45 (1980);
and Hyder v. Jones, 271 S.C. 85, 245 S.E.2d 123 (1978). The court's decision in Schall
was perhaps foreshadowed by Hatfield v. Atlas Enter., Inc., 274 S.C. 247, 262 S.E.2d 900
(1980)(where an allegedly defective product was sold and had produced an injury prior
to the effective date of § 15-73-10, the strict liability statute could not be applied retro-
actively). For a discussion of Hatfield, see Torts, Annual Survey of S.C. Law, 33 S.C.L.
REV. 173-80 (1981).
51. 278 S.C. at 650, 300 S.E.2d at 737. A plaintiff injured by a defective product may
still file suit under a theory of warranty. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 36-2-312 to -
318 (1976)(South Carolina's U.C.C. provisions concerning warranty). Injured plaintiffs
may also file suit under traditional common law negligence theories. Strict liability is an
attractive theory for plaintiffs because it eliminates from negligence analysis the need to
prove breach of a duty of due care and does away with the privity requirements of war-
ranty law.
52. For a discussion of the problem of retroactive application of laws, see generally
Schaefer, Prospective Rulings: Two Perspectives, 1982 Sup. CT. Ray. 1-24; Munzer, A
Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 Tzx. L. Rav. 425-80 (1982).
53. Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 273 Ark. 33, 616 S.W.2d 720 (1981).
The court in Forrest found that the jury's verdict of negligence mooted the strict liability
question. Id. at 41, 616 S.W.2d at 725. In dicta, however, the court indicated that the
8
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and Maine 54 indicated they would permit such suits, while the
supreme court of Georgia refused to allow the action.55 In its de-
cision the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the reasoning
of all three state courts. 6
The Arkansas Supreme Court in Forrest City Machine
Works, Inc. v. Aderhold5 7 reasoned that the strict liability stat-
ute merely provided a new remedy for an existing claim."" The
court concluded that there was no new substantive right to be
applied retroactively.5 9 The South Carolina Supreme Court re-
fused to characterize section 15-73-10 as remedial in nature, and
declared that a new cause of action was created when the strict
liability statute was enacted. 0
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in Adams v. Buffalo
Forge Co.,61 permitted suit under the strict liability statute, de-
termining that the plaintiff's cause of action did not arise until
the defective product caused an injury.2 Therefore, retroactivity
was not at issue as the injury occurred after the statute's enact-
ment. The Maine court noted that the sale of the product prior
to the passage of the strict liability law was simply an event
leading to the ultimate cause of action. The court observed: "All
new laws, when applied, are applied to a state of affairs created
by past events."
6 3
strict liability statute would be applicable, notwithstanding sale of the product prior to
the statute's enactment. Id. at 42, 616 S.W.2d at 725.
54. Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932 (Me. 1982); Goodman v. Magnavox
Co., 443 A.2d 945 (Me. 1982).
55. Wansor v. George Hantscho Co., 243 Ga. 91, 252 S.E.2d 623 (1979).
56. 278 S.C. at 649, 300 S.E.2d at 736.
57. 273 Ark. 33, 616 S.W.2d 720 (1981).
58. Id. at 41-42, 616 S.W.2d at 724-25.
59. Id. at 41, 616 S.W.2d at 725. The court explained that remedial statutes do not
disturb vested rights or create new obligations but rather supply a new remedy to en-
force existing rights. Id. at 42, 616 S.W.2d at 725 (quoting Harrison v. Matthews, 235
Ark. 915, 917, 362 S.W.2d 704, 705 (1962)). In addition, the Arkansas legislature had
specifically stated that the strict liability statute was remedial in nature. Id. at 42, 616
S.W.2d at 725.
60. 278 S.C. at 648, 300 S.E.2d at 736.
61. 443 A.2d 932 (Me. 1982).
62. Id. at 942.
63. Id. at 942-43 (citing Whipple v. Howser, 291 Or. 475, 488, 632 P.2d 782, 790
(1981)). The court stated that legislation which readjusts rights and burdens is not un-
lawful merely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations, even though the effect of
the law imposes a new duty based on past acts. 443 A.2d at 943 (citing Usery v. Turner
Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16 (1976)).
19851 TORTS
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The court in Schall rejected the reasoning in Adams.6 4 The
court in Adams had held that the strict liability cause of action
arises at the date of injury and therefore used that date to deter-
mine whether the statute was retroactively applied."' Without
explaining its rationale, the South Carolina Supreme Court in-
stead selected a point near the beginning of the relevant chain of
events, the date the product was marketed, to determine
retroactivity.6
The Georgia Supreme Court, in Wansor v. George Hantscho
Co.,6 7 also chose to measure retroactivity by the date the defec-
tive product was sold.68 The Georgia court stressed that legisla-
tive enactment of strict liability in tort created a new cause of
action in that state.69 However, the court in Schall rejected the
Wansor analysis as well.7 0 Georgia's strict liability statute was
held to differ substantially from section 15-73-10, as the Georgia
statute appeared to be based upon a warranty theory.
The South Carolina Supreme Court failed to provide policy
reasons for its decision to use the defective product's marketing
date as the first point in analyzing retroactivity. However, sound
reasons support the choice. If a law altering liability is passed
after a product is sold, the manufacturer has no opportunity to
alter his previously sold products. The law cannot deter acts
which have already taken place. The manufacturer would also be
deprived of any opportunity to shift the cost of increased liabil-
64. 278 S.C. at 649, 300 S.E.2d at 736.
65. 443 A.2d at 943.
66. 278 S.C. at 650, 300 S.E.2d at 737.
67. 243 Ga. 91, 252 S.E.2d 623 (1979).
68. Id. at 93, 252 S.E.2d at 625.
69. Id. at 92-93, 252 S.E.2d at 624-25.
70. 278 S.C. at 649, 300 S.E.2d at 736.
71. Id. In fact, the wording of the Georgia strict liability statute differs notably from
the South Carolina statute:
The manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property directly or
through a dealer or any other person shall be liable in tort, irrespective of priv-
ity, to any natural person who may use, consume, or reasonably be affected by
the property and who suffers injury to his person or property because the
property when sold by the manufacturer was not merchantable and reasona-
bly suited to the use intended, and its condition when sold is the proximate
cause of the injury sustained.
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11(b)(1)(1982)(emphasis added). Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-
73-10 (1976), set forth supra note 2.
[V7ol. 36
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ity to the marketplace.7 2 Considerations of fairness are also im-
portant. The manufacturer, faced with a strict liability suit
stemming from a product marketed several years before the
statute's enactment, may find it difficult to construct a defense.
The passage of time may make the gathering of evidence ex-
tremely burdensome.
Schall is an important contribution to products liability law
in South Carolina. Of obvious impact is the supreme court's
statement that no cause of action in strict liability exists if a
defective product entered the marketplace before July 9, 1974.
The decision is, however, significant not only for drawing a clear
time line, but also for providing a theoretical characterization of
strict liability.73 Future litigants should note the court's empha-
sis that a strict liability claim will not be analyzed under war-
ranty or negligence concepts. Theories of recovery and defense
strategies should be tailored accordingly.
Mary Donne Peters
II. RIGHT TO INDEMNITY WHERE INDEMNITOR Is LIABLE IN
STRICT TORT AND INDEMNITEE Is LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENCE
In Stuck v. Pioneer Logging Machinery, Inc., 4 the South
Carolina Supreme Court expanded the remedy of indemnity to
include a right of indemnity from a strictly liable defendant to a
defendant whose liability is founded on a theory of negligence.
This case was one of first impression in South Carolina.
In January 1977, Stuck contacted Pioneer Logging Machin-
ery concerning the purchase of mechanical harvesting equip-
ment. Pioneer's salesman recommended that Stuck purchase a
used Barko loader mounted on a used International truck. After
Pioneer's agents drove this vehicle to Stuck's job site for a dem-
onstration, Stuck purchased the equipment. On January 25,
1977, Stuck's employee drove the equipment for the first time.
After being operated for less than a mile, the truck's rear axle
assembly shifted, causing the driver to lose control of the vehicle
and to collide with an approaching car. The collision killed the
72. See generally Munzer, supra note 52, at 426-444.
73. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
74. 279 S.C. 22, 301 S.E.2d 552 (1983).
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driver of the oncoming vehicle and seriously injured a passenger.
In a wrongful death action against Stuck, the jury returned
a verdict against him.75 Stuck then sought indemnification from
Pioneer, alleging that the sole proximate cause of the accident
was the defective condition of the truck."0 His cause of action
was founded upon statutory provisions regarding breach of an
express warranty,r7 breach of an implied warranty of fitness for
particular purpose, 7 and strict liability in tort.79 The trial court
found that, at the time of the accident, the truck was being used
for its intended purpose, and that the truck was in an unreason-
ably dangerous and defective condition at the time of the sale.80
Stuck's obligation to the decedent was based on his justifiable
reliance on the representations and warranties of Pioneer re-
garding the condition of the vehicle. 81 Therefore, the parties
were not joint tortfeasors, and Stuck was entitled to
indemnity.
82
The South Carolina Supreme Court, applying modern equi-
table principles, 83 held that Pioneer had an obligation to indem-
nify Stuck because Stuck was exposed to liability by the wrong-
ful act of Pioneer in selling defective equipment in an
unreasonably dangerous condition, and because Stuck did not
join in this wrongful act." The court further held that Stuck's
failure to discover and correct the defects did not excuse Pio-
neer's breach.
8 5
In ruling that Stuck and Pioneer were not joint tortfeasors,
75. Id. at 23, 301 S.E.2d at 553.
76. Id.
77. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-313 (1976).
78. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-315 (1976).
79. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (1976).
80. Brief of Respondent at 7-8.
81. Id.
82. 279 S.C. at 24, 301 S.E.2d at 553.
83. The court stated:
According to equitable principles, a right of indemnity exists whenever the re-
lation between the parties is such that either in law or in equity there is an
obligation on one party to indemnify the other, as where one person is exposed
to liability by the wrongful act of another in which he does not join.
279 S.C. at 24, 301 S.E.2d at 553 (citing 41 Am. JUR.2D Indemnity § 2 (1968); 42 C.J.S.
Indemnity § 21 (1944)).
84. 279 S.C. at 24, 301 S.E.2d at 553.
85. Id. at 25, 301 S.E.2d at 553. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A
comment n (1966).
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the court reasoned that Stuck's action was not based on negli-
gence, but rather on strict tort liability and breach of warranty.86
This step was necessary to the court's analysis, since South Car-
olina follows the common law rule that no right of indemnity
exists among joint tortfeasors. 7 This rule is premised upon the
principle that "the Courts are not open to wrongdoers to assist
them in adjusting the burdens of their misconduct, and that the
law will not lend its aid to one who founds his cause of action on
a delict."'8 Therefore, the court reasoned that it was not overrul-
ing any established principles.
In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Whetstone,9 the leading
case prior to Stuck, the right to indemnity was barred because
both parties were found to be negligent to some degree. Stuck
avoided this bar by basing his action against the defendant on
the theories of strict tort liability and breach of warranty.
Therefore, a more equitable result followed. Even though Stuck
had been found negligent in the wrongful death suit, the two
parties in the indemnity action were not joint tortfeasors and a
right of indemnity existed. The conclusion emerging from Stuck
is that a party which has been adjudged negligent should, when
seeking indemnity, plead a theory other than the negligence of
the indemnitor.
The court in Stuck placed great weight on the decision in
South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v. Utilities Construction
Co.90 In that case the defendant, an independent contractor, en-
86. 279 S.C. at 24, 301 S.E.2d at 554.
87. The leading case on this point is Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Whetstone, 243
S.C. 61, 132 S.E.2d 172 (1963). Whetstone arose when an employee of the railroad was
injured while riding on the front of a tank car which struck a scaffold erected by the
defendant. The employee filed a claim against the railroad under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976). After settling the employee's claim, the
railroad asserted that it was entitled to indemnity from the defendant upon the theory
that the employee's injury was directly and proximately caused by the defendant's "ac-
tive gross negligence and carelessness," 243 S.C. at 66, 132 S.E.2d at 174, in erecting and
permitting the unlit and unmarked scaffold to remain too close to the railroad tracks. In
rejecting this claim, the court held that no right of indemnity exists among joint
tortfeasors. Id. at 68, 132 S.E.2d at 175. The court reasoned that since a finding of negli-
gence is required to impose liability under the FELA, the railroad's settlement had ef-
fected an admission of negligence. Id. Therefore, the railroad had admitted that it was a
joint tortfeasor and had no right of indemnity from the defendant. Id.
88. 243 S.C. at 68, 132 S.E.2d at 175 (citing 27 Am. JuR. Indemnity § 18 (1940)).
89. See discussion of factual background, supra note 87.
90. 244 S.C. 79, 135 S.E.2d 613 (1964).
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tered into a written contract with the plaintiff, an electric com-
pany, to perform maintenance work on a sidewalk. The contract
included an express provision whereby the contractor agreed to
indemnify the electric company for any claims for damages aris-
ing out of the work performed by the contractor.91 Due to the
contractor's defective repairs, a pedestrian was injured in a fall.
The electric company, which was liable to the pedestrian pursu-
ant to a city ordinance, 2 settled the pedestrian's claim and then
sought indemnification from the contractor under the express
provision of the contract, and under a right of indemnity im-
plied in law. 3 The defendant, contending that the electric com-
pany was negligent in failing to discover and correct the defect,
argued that they were joint tortfeasors and, thus, no right to in-
demnity existed. 4 The court concluded that the parties were not
joint tortfeasors since the plaintiff was negligent only through
the imputation to it, by operation of law, of the negligence of the
defendant, and upheld the indemnity claim by virtue of the ex-
press contractual provision.a
In both Stuck and South Carolina Electric & Gas Com-
pany, the indemnitee was liable to the injured party on some
theory of imputed negligence.96 This similarity suggests that the
court's reliance on South Carolina Electric & Gas Company was
well founded. Stuck, however, extends the basic theory of South
Carolina Electric & Gas Company by allowing recovery even in
the absence of an express indemnity provision. By granting re-
covery on the theory of an implied contract of indemnity, arising
from breach of warranty and strict tort liability, Stuck raises the
91. The provision read, "The Contractor hereby agrees to indemnify and to hold the
Company harmless from any and all claims for damages to persons and/or property aris-
ing out of or in any way connected with the performance of any work covered by this
contract." Id. at 83, 135 S.E.2d at 614.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 84, 135 S.E.2d at 615.
94. Id. at 87, 135 S.E.2d at 616.
95. Id. at 90-91, 135 S.E.2d at 617-18. For a discussion of indemnity based on ex-
press contracts, see 41 AM. JUR. 2D Indemnity §§ 6-18 (1968); 42 C.J.S. Indemnity §§ 4-
19 (1944).
96. In South Carolina Electric & Gas Company, the electric company's liability to
the pedestrian was based upon a breach of a statutory duty. The only party at fault was
the contractor, whose negligence was imputed to the electric company. The plaintiff in
Stuck was found to be negligent in a wrongful death action. His negligence was based on
the principle of respondeat superior, Brief of Respondent at 2, with the alleged wrong of
his employee being imputed to him.
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possibility of an implied contract for indemnification in every
consumer transaction where the merchandise is not delivered in
the condition represented before sale. The special legal relation-
ship inherent in the sales transaction imposes certain duties on
the seller which, if subsequently breached, permit an implied
contract of indemnification to arise.
7
An examination of other jurisdictions reveals a more liberal
approach to the problem of indemnity among tortfeasors. Many
of these decisions extend recovery to an indemnitee who is liable
for actual negligence. In Suvada v. White Motor Co.,95 the Su-
preme Court of Illinois entertained an indemnity action by the
owners of a milk truck that collided with a bus, against the man-
ufacturer of the truck's defective brake system. The defendant
argued that the plaintiffs, by reason of their actionable negli-
gence, were precluded from seeking indemnity. The court re-
jected this argument, stating that, "Plaintiffs' liability for dam-
age to the bus and injuries to the bus passengers must, of course,
be based on their negligence, as [defendant] suggests. It does not
follow, however, that plaintiff's [sic] negligence will, as a matter
of law, as [defendant] argues, prevent them from seeking indem-
nity from [defendant]." 9 9 Subsequent cases have reinforced the
Suvada reasoning.100
The analysis used in Suvada may be the next stage in the
97. For a general discussion of the theory of an implied contract of indemnification,
see 41 AM. Jur 2D Indemnity §§ 19-27 (1968); 42 C.J.S. Indemnity §§ 20-27 (1944).
98. 32 IMI. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
99. Id. at 624, 210 N.E.2d at 188.
100. In Texaco, Inc. v. McGrew Lumber Co., 117 IlL App. 2d 351, 254 N.E.2d 584
(1969), the plaintiff, which had settled a claim against it by a workman injured in a fall
from defective scaffolding, sought indemnity from the lumber company that had sup-
plied the scaffolding. While recognizing that the plaintiff had been negligent in failing to
discover the -defective plank, the court nevertheless allowed indemnity based on the pol-
icy considerations announced in Suvada. Id., 254 N.E.2d at 588. The court reasoned that
there was a strong public policy in favor of placing the economic burden on the party
which places a product in the stream of commerce with the knowledge of its intended
use, id., and stated that this policy can even go to the extent of ignoring the indemnitee's
fault. Id. at 357-58, 254 N.E.2d at 588.
Hawkeye Security Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1972), also
relied on Suvada. A truck equipped with defective brakes collided with a farm tractor. A
judgment obtained against the insured was satisfied by the plaintiff, Hawkeye, which
then sought indemnity from Ford, the manufacturer of the truck. The court noted that
since the plaintiff's action was based on strict tort liability, the insured's negligence in
failing to discover the defect did not absolve Ford of liability in the indemnity action. Id.
at 380.
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evolution of the law in South Carolina. Because Stuck's negli-
gence was based on imputed negligence, the court did not con-
front the Suvada situation where the indemnitee was guilty of
actual negligence. The broad language in Stuck, suggesting that
a failure to discover and correct defects does not defeat a claim
to indemnity,"'1 suggests, however, that the court would be in-
clined to overlook the indemnitee's actual negligence when the
indemnitor is strictly liable. Since the doctrine of indemnity is
an "all-or-nothing" remedy, this approach is more equitable, as
it places the financial burden on the party actually responsible
for initiating the injury. Indeed, public policy considerations jus-
tify the shift of the economic burden onto the party which has
placed the defective product into the stream of commerce with
knowledge of its intended use.102
Some legal authorities have suggested that the remedy of
indemnity has been expanded to such an extent that contribu-
tion would be a more appropriate remedy.0 s The doctrine of
contribution apportions the financial responsibilities among -the
multiple defendants according to their relative degrees of
fault,104 possibly eliminating the confusion over the technicali-
ties of indemnity. Thus, the doctrine mitigates the harshness of
the "all-or-nothing" indemnity remedy while maintaining the
policy of placing the major responsibility on the more culpable
party. Although a majority of the states have statutorily adopted
the doctrine of contribution,10 5 South Carolina has not.'e Per-
haps it is time for South Carolina to make an attempt to enact
comparative fault legislation, thus bringing itself into line with
101. 279 S.C. at 25, 301 S.E.2d at 553.
102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 402A comment c (1966).
103. See generally Oldham and Maynard, Indemnity and Contribution Between
Strictly Liable and Negligent Defendants, 28 FED'N INS. COrN. Q. 139 (1978); Sales,
Contribution and Indemnity Between Negligent and Strictly Liable Tortfeasors, 12 ST.
MARY L.J. 323 (1980).
104. 18 AM. Jun. 2D Contribution § 1 (1965).
105. See Oldham and Maynard, supra note 103, at 145.
106. Contribution is entirely a creature of statute and exists in states that recognize
the principle of comparative fault. W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 305-10
(4th ed. 1971). South Carolina once had a comparative fault statute, S.C. CODE ANN. §
15-1-300 (1976), that was declared to be unconstitutional because it applied only to those
involved in automobile accidents. Marley v. Kirby, 271 S.C. 122, 245 S.E.2d 604 (1978).
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the majority of states that follow more equitable principles.
Jennifer Albert
Aleta M. Pillick
I. BAD FAITH REFUSAL TO PAY FIRST PARTY BENEFITS
In Nichols v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 107 the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted a new cause
of action in tort for an insurer's bad faith handling of a claim for
first party benefits. The effect of this decision is to expand sig-
nificantly the recoverable damages beyond those which have his-
torically been available under a breach of contract theory. Nich-
ols places South Carolina among the growing number of
jurisdictions which have recognized this cause of action. 08
The dispute arose after Nichols' automobile had been stolen
from a parking lot. Although the car, which was insured against
theft through State Farm, was later recovered, it had been badly
damaged. After State Farm declined to pay the full claim for
reimbursement, Nichols brought suit on two causes of action,
breach of contract and bad faith refusal to pay first party bene-
fits. The jury found for Nichols on both causes of action. The
trial judge, however, reasoning that Nichols was not entitled to
double recovery of actual damages under both the contract and
tort actions, reformed the verdict. The judge struck the damages
on the contract action but sustained the award on the tort ac-
107. 279 S.C. 336, 306 S.E.2d 616 (1983).
108. The cause of action for bad faith refusal to pay first party benefits has been
recognized in over 25 states. Id. at 339, 306 S.E.2d at 618. See, e.g., Craft v. Economy
Fire & Cas. Co., 572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1978) (applying Indiana law); Phillips v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 473 F. Supp. 984 (D. Vt. 1979); Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. Fla. 1976); United States Auto. Assoc. v. Werley, 526 P.2d
28 (Alaska 1974)(dicta); Noble v. Natl Am. Life Ins. Co., 128 Ariz. 188, 624 P.2d 866
(1981); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480
(1973); Grand Sheet Metal v. Protection Mut. Ins., 34 Conn. Sup. 46, 375 A.2d 428
(1977); Ledingham v. Blue Cross, 29 Ill. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 64 I1I2d 338, 1 IL Dec. 75, 356 N.E.2d 75 (1976); United States Fidelity
v. Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d 1070 (1975); Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. West-
chester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1979); Kirk v. Safeco Ins. Co., 28 Ohio Misc.
44, 273 N.E.2d 919 (1970); Christian v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978);
Diamon v. Penn. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 247 Pa. Super. 534, 372 A.2d 1218 (1977); Bibeault
v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313 (R.I. 1980); MFA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flint, 574 S.W.2d
718 (Tenn. 1978); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 271 N.W.2d 368
(1978).
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tion." Attorney's fees were also awarded. 110
The supreme court affirmed the adoption of the new cause
of action, holding that an insured who can demonstrate bad
faith or unreasonable action by the insurer in processing a claim
under the insurance contract has stated a cause of action in
tort.1 As a result, the insured is no longer limited to contrac-
tual damages, but may recover all actual and consequential dam-
ages incurred.112 If the insured can further demonstrate that the
insurer's actions were willful or in reckless disregard of his
rights, punitive damages are recoverable.1
While the court acknowledged that a plaintiff may elect to
plead both contract and tort causes of action,114 the court noted
that where a jury finds in favor of the plaintiff on both causes of
action, the verdict must be reformed to prevent double recovery
of actual damages.11 5 The court further held the statutory provi-
sion 16 for attorney's fees inapplicable to a tort action, and va-
cated the award.111
The court relied on the seminal case of Gruenberg v. Aetna
Insurance Co., 1 ' in which the Supreme Court of California first
allowed an action in tort for bad faith refusal to pay first party
benefits. Building upon California precedents that had estab-
lished an insurer's duty to deal fairly and in good faith with an
insured in a third party claim context,119 the California court
reasoned that the duty of the insurer to act fairly in the han-
109. 279 S.C. at 339, 306 S.E.2d at 618.
110. 279 S.C. at 342, 306 S.E.2d at 620. The trial judge recognized that attorney's
fees of up to $2,500 had long been authorized in breach of contract suits against insurers.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-9-320(1)(1976). The supreme court rejected this extension of
award of attorney's fees to the tort action. 279 S.C. at 342, 306 S.E.2d at 620.
111. 279 S.C. at 340, 306 S.E.2d at 619.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. The rationale for pleading both causes of action is that in the breach of con-
tract suit, the plaintiff need only show that his claim is valid, whereas in the tort action
the plaintiff must prove bad faith or unreasonable conduct. 279 S.C. at 340-41, 306
S.E.2d at 619. Thus, a jury may find for the plaintiff on the contract action, and the
insurer on the tort action.
115. Id. at 341, 306 S.E.2d at 619.
116. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-9-320(1)(1976).
117. 279 S.C. at 342, 306 S.E.2d at 620.
118. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
119. See, e.g., Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
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dling of claims by third persons against the insured extended to
first party claims.120 The court considered the duty as one im-
posed by law, not arising from the contract itself.2 1 Thus, the
court held that the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing which exists in every insurance contract subjects an insurer
who unreasonably withholds first party benefits to tort
liability.
12 2
South Carolina precedent, commonly referred to as the
"Tyger River Doctrine,1' 23 has established an insurer's duty to
deal fairly concerning third party claims. In Tyger River Pine
Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.,112 the court held that an insurer's
unreasonable refusal to settle within policy limits subjected it to
tort liability. The court in Nichols considered its holding to be
an extension of the Tyger River Doctrine.'23 The court's reason-
ing tracked the development of California law in Gruenberg con-
cerning the similarity between first party and third party bad
faith actions.
12 6
120. 9 Cal. 3d at 573, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
121. Id. at 574, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
122. Id.
123. See 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346 (1933).
124. Id. In Tyger River, an employee of Tyger River Pine Company suffered a per-
manent arm injury on the job. The Maryland Casualty Company insured the employer
for employee claims of up to $5000. The employer promptly notified the insurer of the
accident, but the insurer failed to start an investigation until seven months later. Al-
though the employer urged the insurer to settle, stating that the employee was willing to
settle for less than the policy limit, the insurer refused. Even after receiving a verdict of
$7000, the employee offered to settle for $5000 but the insurer insisted upon appealing.
The appeal was dismissed and the employer was compelled to pay the $2000 excess over
the policy limit. The insurer was held liable for breaching its implied duty to act reason-
ably and in good faith in settlement negotiations and in defense of the insured. Id. at
293, 170 S.E. at 349.
125. 279 S.C. at 340, 306 S.E.2d at 619.
126. Several distinctions, however, remain between third party and first party bad
faith actions. The former may derive from the standard indemnity policy's reserving to
the insurer the exclusive right to defend any suit arising under the policy, and to investi-
gate, evaluate, and settle claims or suits as it deems advisable. The insurer is under the
implied duty to act in good faith in performing these tasks, and the insured is under the
duty to cooperate with the company. The insured-insurer relationship creates a fiduciary
obligation which is breached when the insurer fails to act in good faith as the agent of
the insured. The insurer faces an inherent conflict between its own interest and that of
the insured which it is representing when there is an action or claim against the insured
for an amount in excess of the policy coverage and a corresponding offer to compromise
the claim for an amount at or slightly below the policy limit. An insurer which rejects a
reasonable settlement offer within the policy limits could be held liable for breach of the
duty of good faith if it fails to give adequate consideration to the interests of the insured
19
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The court, citing several public policy reasons for creating
the new cause of action, 127 recognized the distinct advantages of
a tort remedy over a contractual remedy. Under the contract ac-
tion, an insurer might deny valid claims with impunity realizing
that it will ultimately be liable only for the amount of the claim
and possible attorney's fees.128 If the insurer utilizes dilatory
tactics, it might so exhaust insured's energy and resources as to
cause him to abandon the claims or accept grossly inadequate
settlements.1 29 Also, during the period of dilatory tactics and en-
suing litigation, the insurer benefits from the use of the insured's
money. 80 The threat of a tort action would prevent such behav-
ior on the part of the insurer since it may now be held liable for
extra-contractual damages.
Until Nichols, South Carolina courts applied general rules
of contract law to limit recovery to the face amount of the policy
in actions by an insured to recover under his policy.31 The basis
for this limitation of damages was that an insurance policy was
simply a contract to pay money.1 3 2 Although it may be argued
in rejecting the settlement offer. Myers, Bad Faith: A Tort Expands to Protect the In-
sured, TRIAL, March 1982, at 56.
The inherent conflict of interest does not exist in the same way in first party cover-
age where the insured seeks benefits directly payable under an insurance contract from
his own insurance company. The insurer does not undertake to perform any other service
for the insured and may unambiguously oppose the insured in seeking to deny all or part
of the benefits under the policy. The risk of a judgment outside the policy limits does not
exist in first party coverage cases. The insured is, however, no less injured by his insur-
ance company's failure to act in good faith with him as he would be had the insurer
unreasonably refused to settle with a third party. This practical consideration seems to
be part of the reason underlying the court's expansion of the "Tyger River Doctrine."
127. The court noted that the insurance industry is affected with a public interest.
279 S.C. at 340, 306 S.E.2d at 619 (citing Hinds v. United Ins. Co. of America, 248 S.C.
285, 149 S.E.2d 771 (1966)). The court recognized that the insured ordinarily possesses
no bargaining power or means to protect himself against unfair treatment by the insurer.
279 S.C. at 340, 306 S.E.2d at 619.
128. 279 S.C. at 340, 306 S.E.2d at 619.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. This rule simply followed the common-law rule limiting damages for breach of
contract that was established in Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
First, certain damages are recoverable as being contemplated by the parties since they
naturally flow from the breach. Second, consequential damages are recoverable as being
contemplated by the parties if the promissor, at the time of making the contract, knows
or should know of special circumstances giving rise to those damages. The consequential
damages which an insured might seek for the insurer's breach of an insurance contract
would be for economic loss and/or emotional distress. Courts applying the rule of Hadley
20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol36/iss2/6
TORTS
that treating the insurance contract like any other contract pro-
vided certainty and stability to the law of insurance, some vic-
tims of the insurer's breach were unable to recover compensa-
tion for economic loss and the mental distress caused by the
breach.
The concept of an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is not peculiar to insurance contracts.3 3 In the insurance
area, however, the implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair
dealing was first applied in third party "duty to settle" cases
because the breach resulted in monetary damages which were
not recoverable from the insurer in an action on the insurance
contract."" By contrast, in the first party cases, the insured
could always maintain an action to enforce the contract. The in-
sured, however, could not recover consequential damages proxi-
mately caused by the insurer's breach. The duty of good faith
was thus extended to first party situations because insurance
policies, not being ordinary commercial contracts, 35 involve a
special fiduciary relationship arising from the insurer's tradi-
tional role as protector of its insured.3 86 The expansion of recov-
ery for economic loss and emotional distress under the tort cause
of action appears to provide a more equitable means of dealing
with the problem of an insurer's refusal to pay first party
benefits.
The practitioner should be aware that other tort causes of
action are available to recover extra-contractual damages for an
insurer's bad faith refusal to pay first party benefits. First, sev-
eral states permit recovery against an insurer on the basis of the
independent tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress' 7
v. Baxendale strictly would probably find damages for emotional distress not to be fore-
seeable at the time the contract was made. Also, the insured would be denied punitive
damages under Hadley v. Baxendale since punitive damages are not contemplated when
an insurance contract is made. Tornehl, Insurer's Liability for Wrongful Refusal to
Honor First Party Claims, 29 FEV'N INS. COUN. Q. 397, 399-400 (1979). See generally
Zurek, First Party Insurance: Claims, Practices and Procedures in Light of Extra-Con-
tractual Damage Actions, 27 DREm L. REv. 666 (1978).
133. See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1976)("[e]very contract or duty within this Act imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement") and RESTATEME (SEcoND)
OF CoNmzCTs § 231 (1981)("[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good
faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement").
134. 170 S.C. at 288-89, 170 S.E. at 347.
135. 279 S.C. at 340, 306 S.E.2d at 619.
136. Id.
137. See, e.g., Fletcher v. W. Nat'1 Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr.
1985]
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if the insurer's conduct in processing a claim has been extreme
and outrageous. Second, an action may also lie in fraud. If the
insurer induces the insured to purchase the policy by misrepre-
senting the terms or benefits of the policy or the means of han-
dling claims, an action for fraud in the inducement may be ap-
propriate.138 If, after a claim has been made, the insurer
misrepresents its obligations under the policy in order to induce
a reduced settlement or abandonment of the claim, fraud may
also lie.139 Under a theory of fraudulent inducement, some
states, including South Carolina,140 will allow the insured to re-
cover damages in excess of the policy coverage. 4 1 The problem,
however, in pursuing either of these two theories is the difficulty
of proof.1 42 However, even if the insurer's bad faith does not rise
to either of these two causes of action, it may support an action
for bad faith refusal to pay first party benefits.
One issue unresolved by the court in Nichols is the question
of to whom the duty to act in good faith extends. This issue was
partially answered by the court in the companion cases of Rich-
ard E. Carter v. American Mutual Fire Insurance Co.143 (here-
inafter Carter 1) and Diane Carter v. American Mutual Fire In-
surance Co.1 44 (hereinafter Carter I). After the Carters' home
had been damaged by fire, the insurer refused to compensate
Mr. Carter, the policyholder, for the loss. The supreme court, in
Carter I, relied on Nichols, holding that Mr. Carter had stated a
78 (1970). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 46 (1965) which lists the following
elements for the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress:
(1) outrageous conduct by the defendant;
(2) the defendant's intention of causing or reckless disregard of causing emo-
tional distress;
(3) the plaintiffs suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and
(4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defen-
dant's outrageous conduct.
138. Tornehl, supra note 132, at 415.
139. Id.
140. See Corley v. Coastal States Life Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 1, 135 S.E.2d 316
(1964)(award of punitive damages in a contract action when the breach amounted to, or
was accompanied by, a fraudulent act).
141. Tornehl, supra note 132, at 415.
142. See Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.C. 157, 276 S.E.2d 776 (1981) (intentional infliction
of emotional distress); O'Shields v. S. Fountain Mobile Homes, Inc., 262 S.C. 276, 204
S.E.2d 50 (1974)(fraud).
143. 279 S.C. 367, 307 S.E.2d 225 (1983).
144. 279 S.C. 368, 307 S.E.2d 227 (1983).
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cause of action for bad faith refusal by an insurer to pay first
party benefits.145 The court, however, in Carter II barred Ms.
Carter's action for bad faith refusal of an insurer to pay first
party benefits, holding that a mere contingent interest, such as
an inchoate dower interest, in the insured property did not con-
fer standing to bring an action for bad faith refusal to pay first
party benefits. 146 The court stated that the action extended only
to one who was a party to the policy or was a named insured
under the policy.
1 47
The court appears to rely on the contract to limit the tort
cause of action. Most jurisdictions have approached this issue in
a similar manner.148 Perhaps the courts feel that a broad cause
of action such as bad faith refusal to pay first party benefits
should be limited by the language of the contract.
A related issue is the question of who may be held liable for
breach of the duty to deal in good faith. The insurer is invaria-
bly a corporation, acting only through its agents and employees,
raising a question about the duties imposed on or assumed by
the insurer's agents and employees in performing their duties of
employment. The corporate insurer is liable for the torts of its
officers, agents and employees under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.149 In Austero v. National Casualty Company of De-
troit, Michigan,5 " the court held that since the insurer's claims
representative was not a party to the contract of insurance, he
was under no personal duty to act in good faith or deal fairly
145. 279 S.C. at 368, 307 S.E.2d at 226.
146. 279 S.C. at 370, 307 S.E.2d at 227.
147. Id.
148. See Austero v. Natl Cas. Co. of Detroit, Mich., 62 Cal. App. 3d 511, 133 Cal.
Rptr. 107 (1976), in which the insured under a disability policy was an attorney suffering
from a disease that rendered him mentally incompetent. His wife, who was neither a
named beneficiary nor an insured under the disability policy, filed a claim for disability
benefits. When the insurer refused to pay policy benefits, the wife sued the insurer as
guardian ad litem of her husband, and individually on her own behalf seeking damages
for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court held that the
insurer's duty was owed solely to its insured and, possibly, to express beneficiaries of the
policy. 62 Cal. App. 3d at 517, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 111. Since the wife in Austero was at
most an incidental or remote beneficiary of the disability benefits, she had no cause of
action against the insurer.
149. See 53 AM. JuR. 2D Master and Servant § 417 (1970); 3 C.J.S. Agency § 423
(1973).
150. 62 Cal. App. 3d 511, 133 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1976).
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with the insured in adjusting losses. 151 The court stated that one
who was not a party to the underlying contract may not be held
liable for breach of the implied covenant of good faith.152 There-
fore, unless the agent becomes a party to the contract, only the
insurance company may be held liable for breach of duty to deal
in good faith.
The court in Nichols did not address the defenses available
to an insurer who has been sued for bad faith refusal to pay first
party benefits. Since both parties to an insurance contract are
subject to the duty to act fairly and in good faith in performing
their obligations under the contract, it might be argued that the
insurer would be excused from the obligation to indemnify if the
insured breached his obligations under the policy. The court in
Gruenberg rejected such an approach, holding that the insurer's
duty is unconditional and independent of the performance of
the insured's contractual obligations. 3 Since the supreme court
followed the Gruenberg analysis so closely in adopting this cause
of action in South Carolina, it is likely that the court would
similarly find that the non-performance by one party of its con-
tractual duties cannot excuse a breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing by the other party.
The insurer may, of course, refute allegations of bad faith
by demonstrating that its denial of benefits was undertaken in
good faith. For an insurer's decision to be made in good faith, it
must be based on a knowledge of the facts and circumstances
upon which the contested liability is predicated.1 " Such a de-
fense can be justified only if the insurer has made an adequate
investigation that revealed facts indicating a likelihood of suc-
cess if the claim were litigated.15 5 Therefore, a lack of reasonable
diligence and the insurer's refusal to determine the extent of lia-
bility evidences bad faith. 56 Under such a test the insurer may
still challenge debatable claims, being held liable only when it
has intentionally withheld benefits without a reasonable basis.5 7
151. Id. at 516, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
152. Id.
153. 9 Cal. 3d at 578, 510 P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
154. See Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 692, 271 N.W.2d 368, 375
(1978).
155. Id. at 693, 271 N.W.2d at 377.
156. Id. at 692, 271 N.W.2d at 375.
157. Id. at 693, 271 N.W.2d at 377.
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In reaching its decision in Nichols, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court has continued its liberal approach to consumer
protection by recognizing a new cause of action in tort for an
insurer's bad faith in handling a claim for first party benefits.
This expansion of liability and the availability of consequential
and punitive damages will have a profound impact on the insur-
ance industry. This new cause of action will provide a measure
of protection to individual policyholders in dealing with insur-
ance companies. This protection was much needed since hereto-
fore, many insurance transactions between an insurer and the
insured were weighted heavily in favor of the insurer. The court
has made a sound and well-reasoned decision in placing South
Carolina among the growing number of jurisdictions recognizing
this cause of action.
Jennifer Albert
Aleta M. Pillick
IV. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION: A CONVICTION CONCLUSIVELY
ESTABLISHES PROBABLE CAUSE
In Deaton v. Leath,55 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that, in a malicious prosecution action, a conviction, even
though subsequently reversed or set aside, conclusively estab-
lishes probable cause for the defendant's having brought the
prior action. Absent a showing that the conviction was obtained
through fraud, perjury or other undue means, it will serve as a
defense in the malicious prosecution action. In this case of first
impression in South Carolina, the supreme court followed the
majority rule.159
The dispute preceding the malicious prosecution action
arose when the Leaths had Deaton arrested and charged with
trespassing and disorderly conduct. Found guilty by the trial
court," 0 Deaton filed a notice of intent to appeal. As a result of
158. 279 S.C. 82, 302 S.E.2d 335 (1983).
159. The majority rule is as follows: "The conviction of the accused by a magistrate
or trial court, although reversed by an appellate tribunal, conclusively establishes the
existence of probable cause, unless the conviction was obtained by fraud, perjury or
other corrupt means." RESTATSMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 667(1)(1977). See also NV.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 845-47 (4th ed. 1971).
160. After having waived his right to a jury trial, Deaton was convicted by the Myr-
tle Beach City Recorder. 279 S.C. at 84, 302 S.E.2d at 336. A recorder's court was a form
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an equipment malfunction, a transcript of the proceedings below
could not be furnished. Because of the malfunction, the court set
aside Deaton's conviction. Upon retrial before a different judge,
he was acquitted.
Deaton subsequently brought an action for malicious prose-
cution"" against the Leaths, who moved for summary judgment
on the ground that Deaton's initial conviction conclusively
demonstrated their probable cause 162 for bringing the action.
The motion was granted, and the supreme court affirmed on
appeal.
In adopting the majority view that a conviction conclusively
establishes probable cause, the court reasoned that, in determin-
ing the existence of probable cause, the inquiry is whether the
malicious prosecution defendant had reasonable cause to believe
the plaintiff guilty, and not whether the plaintiff was guilty or
innocent. 3 The court asserted that an initial conviction neces-
sarily indicates that the court had evidence before it which could
convince a reasonable man of the accused's guilt.' M In the ab-
sence of fraud in the original conviction, a subsequent reversal
does not demonstrate a lack of probable cause, particularly
where the ground for setting aside the conviction is a technical-
of municipal court authorized under the former S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-25-920 (1976). The
provisions pertaining to recorder's courts were repealed by 1980 S.C. Acts 480, effective
January 1, 1981, which provided for a uniform municipal court system. Although S.C.
CoDn ANN. § 14-25-115 (1981) still allows the appointment of ministerial recorders, their
judicial power has been curtailed.
161. To commence an action for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must allege the
following elements: (1) a criminal proceeding was instituted by the defendant against the
plaintiff; (2) the prior proceeding terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the defendant
lacked probable cause for the proceeding;, and (4) the defendant brought the proceeding
for "malice," or for a primary purpose other than that of bringing an offender to justice.
See Eaves v. Broad River Elec. Corp., 277 S.C. 475, 477, 289 S.E.2d 414, 415 (1932);
REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 653 (1977); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 835 (4th ed. 1971). See generally Note, Malicious Prosecution, 33 S.C.L. Rav. 317
(1981).
162. Probable cause for a criminal prosecution has been defined as a reasonable
ground for suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a prudent man in the belief that the party is guilty of the offense with which he
is charged. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 841 (4th ed. 1971). For an
interpretation of the probable cause requirement in South Carolina, see Parrott v. Plow-
den Motor Co., 246 S.C. 318, 322, 143 S.E.2d 607, 609 (1977).
163. 279 S.C. at 84, 302 S.E.2d at 336 (citing Kinton v. Mobile Home Industries,
Inc., 274 S.C. 179, 262 S.E.2d 727 (1980)).
164. 279 S.C. at 84, 302 S.E.2d at 336.
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ity.'6 5 Concluding that the majority rule was a "well reasoned
one,"166 the court accepted it.
The court cited numerous decisions illustrating application
of the majority rule,67 including Falkner v. Almon,"6 a North
Carolina case in which the malicious prosecution plaintiff had,
as had Deaton, been convicted of trespass. In the ensuing ap-
peal, the State, entered a nolle prosequi. e9 The plaintiff ob-
tained a jury verdict in the subsequent malicious prosecution ac-
tion. The court of appeals, however, reversed, holding that the
original trespass conviction conclusively established probable
cause. 170
The court's reliance on Falkner is noteworthy in several re-
spects. Application of the majority rule in nolle prosequi cases is
not free from criticism. One inference arising from a prosecutor's
decision to abandon an appeal is that the prosecutor, reviewing
the merits of the case, decided that the evidence of probable
cause or guilt beyond a reasonable doubt could not be sus-
tained. 1 Invocation of the majority rule in such circumstances
may seem unnecessarily harsh. Contrary authority, however,
maintains that a malicious prosecution defendant should not be
prejudiced by the prior actions of a public prosecutor over whom
he has no control.172 Application of the majority rule should,
therefore, proceed. The court in Deaton did not have to resolve
165. Id. at 85, 302 S.E.2d at 336.
166. Id. at 84, 302 S.E.2d at 336.
167. The majority cited Falkner v. Almon, 22 N.C. App. 643, 207 S.E.2d 388 (1974);
Boxer v. Slack, 124 W. Va. 149, 19 S.E.2d 606 (1942); Ricketts v. J.G. McCrory Co., 138
Va. 548, 121 S.E. 916 (1924); and Georgia Loan & Trust Co. v. Johnston, 116 Ga. 628, 43
S.E. 27 (1902) in which the respective courts set forth the majority rule without a great
deal of analysis.
168. 22 N.C. App. 643, 207 S.E.2d 388 (1974).
169. A nolle prosequi is a formal entry by the prosecuting officer in which he de-
clares that he will not prosecute the case further. State v. Gaskins, 263 S.C. 343, 347, 210
S.E.2d 590, 592 (1974).
170. 22 N.C. App. at 645, 207 S.E.2d at 389.
171. See Lipford v. M'Collum, 19 S.C.L. (1 Hill) 82 (1833)(the filing of a nolle prose-
qui by a public prosecutor will, as a matter of law, be held as prima facie evidence of lack
of probable cause). But compare White v. Coleman, 277 F. Supp. 292 (D.S.C. 1967)(dis-
continuation of prosecution through entry of nolle prosequi constitutes no evidence of
want of probable cause).
172. See REsTATEmEN (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 665(2)(1977). This theory recognizes
that several different factors may influence a prosecutor to abandon an appeal. While a
lack of probable cause may be one factor, it is possible that the crime may be only a
minor violation, not warranting the expense of an appeal.
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this debate. Arguably Deaton presented a more compelling case
for the conclusive presumption of probable cause since the
ground for setting aside the conviction was a technicality.173 Use
of the North Carolina precedent does, however, suggest that the
court might be willing to invoke the majority rule in a context
broader than that presented in Deaton.
The majority rule has received support from the United
States Supreme Court. In Crescent City Live-stock Landing and
Slaughter-house Co. v. Butchers' Union Slaughter-house and
Live-stock Landing Co.,17 4 the Court considered the effect in a
malicious prosecution action of a guilty verdict that was later
reversed. Quoting with approval Maine precedent17 5 illustrating
the majority rule, the Court remarked that the majority rule was
"well grounded in reason, fair and just to both parties, and con-
sistent with the principle on which the action for malicious pros-
ecution is founded.
' '176
Important public policy considerations underlie the major-
ity rule. The Court in Crescent City stated that the rule was
founded on the policy grounds of vindicating the dignity and au-
thority of judicial tribunals and of according force and sanctity
to judgments.7T The Court reasoned that the integrity of the ju-
dicial system rested upon the invincible presumption that a ju-
dicial tribunal acted impartially and honestly.178 Because the
rule respected the verity of a previous court, and not of the par-
ties involved, only fraud in procuring the prior judgment could
defeat the conclusive presumption of probable cause.179
In addition to those policy grounds espoused in Crescent
City, others can be offered. The basis for the majority rule may
173. Chief Justice Lewis rejected the adoption of the majority rule. 279 S.C. at 85-
87, 302 S.E.2d at 336-37. In the alternative he argued that, even if the majority rule is
valid, the present case might constitute an exception to the majority rule. The Chief
Justice reasoned that without a transcript there is no way to determine whether the
conviction was obtained through fraud or perjury. Id. at 86-87, 302 S.E.2d at 337.
174. 120 U.S. 141 (1887).
175. "If there be a conviction before a magistrate having jurisdiction of the subject-
matter, not obtained by undue means, it will be conclusive evidence of probable cause."
Payson v. Caswell, 22 Me. 212, 226 (1842), quoted in Crescent City, 120 U.S. at 151.
176. 120 U.S. at 151.
177. Id. at 159.
178. Id. at 159-60.
179. Id. at 159.
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lie in the disfavored status'80 of the malicious prosecution ac-
tion. Courts believe that honest litigants should be encouraged
to seek justice and should not be deterred by fear of a malicious
prosecution action in return.""1 Public policy requires that citi-
zens be shielded from the unrestricted verdicts of juries when
those citizens initiate proceedings against others whose conduct
they reasonably, albeit mistakenly, believe to be Megal. 82 The
majority rule fulfills this policy objective by removing the ques-
tion of probable cause from the hands of the jury.
In his dissent, Chief Justice Lewis advocated adoption of
the more flexible minority rule that a conviction is only prima
facie evidence of probable cause which the plaintiff may rebut.1
8 3
Reasoning that a multitude of factors distinguish one reversal
from another, he noted that some jurisdictions apply a different
presumption to convictions depending upon the status of the
convicting court."' He maintained that the majority's premise,
that if a court proceeded to conviction it necessarily had evi-
dence before it of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, was conclu-
sively refuted by previous decisions in which the court reversed
convictions on the ground that no evidence at all existed to sup-
port the conviction.185
In support of the minority rule, Chief Justice Lewis cited
Chapman v. City of Reno,5 6 in which the malicious prosecution
plaintiff, convicted by a non-record municipal court, was acquit-
ted upon a trial de novo. The Nevada court reasoned that the
minority rule was appropriate when the plaintiff is acquitted in
a trial de novo in a court of record, on appeal from a conviction
in a minor non-record court. 87 This was so because without a
180. W. PRossm, HANDBOOK or THE LAw oF ToRTs 846 (4th ed. 1971).
181. Id. at 851.
182. Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 183, 192 (1963).
183. 279 S.C. at 85-86, 302 S.E.2d at 336-37 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
184. 279 S.C. at 85, 302 S.E.2d at 337. Those minorty rule jurisdictions making dis-
tinctions based on the nature of the convicting court appear to rely on a type of due
process argument that some inferior courts, for example, police courts or justices of the
peace, do not afford the accused the same incentive to fully litigate the issue of guilt as a
normal court of record would. See, e.g., Hanser v. Bieber, 271 Mo. 326, 197 S.W. 68
(1917) (a conviction in police court, followed by reversal on appeal, is not conclusive
evidence of probable cause when the police court's jurisdiction is limited to recovery of
fines, penalties, and forfeitures for violations of city ordinances).
185. 279 S.C. at 86, 302 S.E.2d at 337.
186. 85 Nev. 365, 455 P.2d 618 (1969).
187. Id. at 369, 455 P.2d at 620.
19851
29
Peters et al.: Torts
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
record it is impossible to know what transpired in the court be-
low, including evidence of fraud, perjury or undue means, the
universally recognized exceptions to the majority rule.188 The
Chapman reasoning applies with full force to the situation in
Deaton, in which there was also no transcript available. Chief
Justice Lewis' well chosen authority points up the majority's
failure to reconcile Deaton's acquittal upon retrial with the ma-
jority's flat assertion that the sole ground for setting aside his
conviction was a technicality.
The difference between the majority and minority rules may
largely be one of semantics. Since proceeding without probable
cause will ordinarily constitute a fraud upon the court, thus
avoiding invocation of the majority rule, the practical effect of
the two rules may be the same.189 The Supreme Court of Illinois
similarly recognized that the difference between the two rules is
more verbal than substantive.190 The court observed, "That
which is prima facie evidence of a fact may be overcome by con-
trary evidence, and a presumption which may be destroyed by
evidence of fraud, false testimony, or other unfair or unlawful
means is not conclusive. "1 9 1
The conclusiveness of a prior guilty verdict, subsequently
reversed, in a malicious prosecution action is an issue that has
provoked two responses. In Deaton, the South Carolina Supreme
Court adopted the majority rule, which has persuasive historical
and public policy support. While the majority did not attempt to
isolate its reasons for preferring one rule over another, this omis-
sion might have been prompted by the court's inability to draw
discernible distinctions between two rules that, in practice,
mean the same thing. Still the court has not considered the
question whether the nonavailability of a transcript constitutes
an exception to the majority rule. Perhaps, then, Deaton should
be construed simply as a case of poor pleading. Future plaintiffs,
with a foundation for alleging fraud, perjury, or other undue
188. Id.
189. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 846 (4th ed. 1971).
190. McElroy v. Catholic Press Co., 254 Ill. 290, 294, 98 N.E. 527, 528 (1912).
191. Id., 98 N.E. at 528-29.
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means in the prior proceeding, should note the need to allege
explicitly such factors in order to avoid the Deaton bar.
Jennifer Albert
Aleta M. Pillick
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